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Product Liability, Research and Development, 
and Innovation 
W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore 
Duke University 
Product liability ideally should promote efficient levels of product 
safety, but misdirected liability efforts may depress beneficial inno- 
vations. This paper examines these competing effects of liability 
costs on product R & D intensity and new product introductions by 
manufacturing firms. At low to moderate levels of expected liability 
costs, there is a positive effect of liability costs on product innovation. 
At very high levels of liability costs, the effect is negative. At the 
sample mean, liability costs increase R & D intensity by 15 percent. 
The greater linkage of these effects to product R & D rather than 
process R & D is consistent with the increased prominence of the 
design defect doctrine. 
I. Introduction 
Management decisions with respect to the product mix are subject to 
a variety of uncertainties. One class of these uncertainties pertains to 
the regulatory environment of the firm, including incentives gener- 
ated by direct government regulation and civil liability. Defective 
products may generate enormous legal liabilities, potentially un- 
dermining not only the profitability of the product but possibly the 
firm itself. In this paper, we explore the role of the product liability 
system in affecting new product development decisions. 
In recent years, widespread attention has been devoted to the liabil- 
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ity crisis.1 Product liability litigation increased dramatically, with the 
number of product liability cases alleging personal injury filed in the 
federal courts rising from 2,393 in 1975 to 13,408 in 1989. Liability 
insurance costs also escalated, as general liability insurance premiums 
increased sixfold from 1975 to 1988. 
Several changes in liability doctrines over the past three decades 
contributed to this growth. First, most jurisdictions adopted strict 
liability, which expands the range of situations in which the producer 
can be found liable. Courts now view producers as serving, in part, 
as product risk insurers. Second, the courts greatly expanded the 
doctrine of design defects and the role of hazard warnings. Whereas 
product liability cases formerly focused on manufacturing defects, a 
firm could now be found liable for a broad range of design defects. 
By doing so, the courts in effect took on functions similar to those of 
product risk regulatory agencies. Third, the emergence of mass toxic 
torts generated litigation on an unprecedented scale. There are over 
100,000 claimants each in the lines of litigation involving asbestos, 
Agent Orange, and the Dalkon Shield. 
The increased emphasis on design defects altered the industrial 
incidence of product liability costs. "Manufacturing defect" cases con- 
centrated liability among older firms that manufactured their prod- 
ucts in a negligent manner, perhaps because of outmoded technolo- 
gies or inadequate quality control. In contrast, design defect cases 
affect all segments of the market. The least innovative firms incur 
liability costs because their products do not reflect the industry's state 
of the art in safety. Highly innovative firms that introduce new prod- 
uct designs with uncertain safety implications run substantial liability 
risks as well. 
High expected product liability costs may depress innovation. The 
Monsanto Company decided not to market its already patented phos- 
phate fiber asbestos substitute because Monsanto "was not prepared 
to accept the potential product liability risks associated with market- 
ing the reinforcing fiber, no matter how safe it may be" (Business 
Insurance, July 20, 1989, p. 3). Similarly, a National Academy of Sci- 
ences (1990) panel concluded that U.S. pharmaceutical firms termi- 
nated research on contraceptive products in part because the liability 
risks were too great. The market for vaccines has also been hard 
hit, as rising liability costs decreased the number of firms producing 
vaccines for five serious childhood diseases from 13 to three during 
the 1980s.2 U.S. private aircraft production plummeted over the same 
1 The subsequent paragraphs draw on a variety of material pertaining to the dimen- 
sion of the liability crisis. See Viscusi (1991 a, 1991b) for documentation. 
2 See Viscusi (1990, 199 1a). Kitch (1985) provides a detailed perspective on how 
liability has affected a variety of specific vaccines. 
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period, with many industry officials citing rising liability costs as a 
major contributing factor. 
To move beyond these anecdotes and case studies, our empirical 
approach considers the relationship between product liability insur- 
ance costs and various aspects of innovation using a large data set on 
firm behavior. The time period we consider, 1980-84, follows by two 
decades the emergence of the design defect doctrine and the initial 
period of adoption of strict liability. As a result, the liability regime 
reflected in the data should fully capture the behavior influenced by 
the central doctrines in modern product liability law. 
Supporters of the current liability regime claim that liability costs 
provide incentives for introducing safer products and eliminating 
unsafe products. Liability critics suggest that the cost increases dis- 
courage innovation more generally. Although we can ascertain the 
nature of product research and development decisions most strongly 
influenced by liability costs, the efficiency properties of these results 
are less clear. Full resolution of the debate on efficiency requires a 
product-specific assessment of the risks and benefits of different de- 
signs. Some products may not provide an efficient level of safety and 
should be either redesigned or perhaps not marketed at all. In a 
perfectly competitive market, fully informed consumers will purchase 
only products that provide an efficient level of product safety. If, 
however, substantial impediments prevent efficient operation, such 
as systematic misperception of accident risks or substantial consumer 
search costs, market outcomes will not be optimal. 
Tort liability can potentially foster greater efficiency in these con- 
texts, particularly since the negligence doctrine and the risk-utility 
test for strict liability are analogous to benefit-cost tests for product 
safety.3 However, the strict liability test imposes additional obligations 
that require the producer to insure the victim's losses, so that the 
standard may be binding even when the firm's level of precaution is 
efficient.4 Moreover, some legal scholars raise the fundamental issue 
of whether juries are qualified to assess the economic merits of alter- 
native product designs. These ambiguities make it difficult to ascribe 
efficiency properties to the product liability-innovation linkage. Our 
primary emphasis will be on documenting the effects of product lia- 
bility rather than on drawing specific conclusions regarding their eco- 
nomic efficiency. 
The analysis focuses on product R & D intensity as the measure of 
3Much of the work of Landes and Posner (1987) and Shavell (1987) deals with the 
efficiency properties of many legal rules in this area. 
4 Viscusi (1991b) explores in greater detail the inadequacies of the risk-utility test 
from an efficiency standpoint and proposes a reformulation of that test based on an 
efficiency-oriented approach. 
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innovative activity and on two different measures of product liability 
costs. Most noteworthy is the robustness of the findings across the 
different dimensions of the product liability-innovation linkage. For 
the majority of business units in our sample, product liability in- 
creases product R & D intensity. This result lends support to the claim 
that higher liability burdens provide incentives for product safety 
improvements. There is, however, a nonlinearity in the product liabil- 
ity-innovation relationship. At high levels of liability costs, liability 
reduces innovative activity. In the third general empirical result, 
more pronounced effects for product innovation relative to process 
innovation reflect the increasingly prominent role of the design de- 
fect doctrine. 
II. Conceptual Framework 
Product liability enters most economic models by simply raising the 
expected costs associated with product risks. Liability costs play a 
limited role in models based on risk-neutral consumers acting on 
perfect information, actuarially fair liability insurance, competitive 
product markets with horizontal supply curves, and losses that are 
monetary equivalents.5 
These conditions are seldom satisfied. Consumer information is 
not always perfect. Moreover, since health effects often involve losses 
that alter the structure of utility functions, consumers will value prod- 
uct safety even with full coverage of their financial losses. Product 
liability cost increases consequently increase the firm's costs and in- 
fluence its risk-related decisions. 
To assess the role of product liability costs, we structure the model 
in terms of the firm's unit profit function Ir, thus focusing on safety 
and innovation decisions rather than on quantity choice.6 The joint 
products of the firm constitute the choice variables and consist of the 
level of product safety s and the degree of product novelty z. The 
level of safety equals one minus the probability of injury. 
A nonlinear hedonic price function consisting of a base product 
price p, a premium ctz for product novelty, and a liability cost f3(s, L) 
describes the unit price of the product. Consumers will pay more for 
product novelty (i.e., et > 0), and we define the scale of the novelty 
5See Spence (1977) for exposition of such a model. See also Oi (1973, 1974), Gold- 
berg (1974), and Epple and Raviv (1978). 
6This simplification follows Spence (1977). Expansion of the model to include a 
quantity choice is straightforward and yields predictable results: higher liability costs 
reduce output. However, addition of this consideration complicates the comparative 
static results by adding a third equation to the system. 
PRODUCT LIABILITY 165 
variable z with no loss of generality so that the novelty price premium 
is a simple linear function of (x and z. 
The unit liability cost f3(s, L) decreases with product safety (ifs < 0) 
and increases with the stringency of the liability regime (AL > 0). In 
an absolute liability regime, where firms pay all expected injury costs, 
a linear formulation in which f3(s, L) = (1 - s)L is appropriate. In 
practice, various liability rules may make the liability cost function a 
nonlinear function of the level of safety s. Under a negligence stan- 
dard, no liability exists unless the firm fails to provide a reasonable 
degree of safety, after which the firm becomes liable for all injury 
costs (see, e.g., Landes and Posner 1987; Shavell 1987; Polinsky 
1989). Even under strict liability, liability on the part of the firm arises 
only when the product fails a risk-utility test, which entails a balancing 
of the costs and benefits of greater product safety.7 Finally, firms 
that market risky products potentially subject themselves to punitive 
damages if they have been particularly remiss in providing for prod- 
uct safety. Another complication is that for very high levels of safety 
P(s, L) may equal zero. 
The inputs necessary to produce safety s and product novelty z are 
given by g(s, z). The input requirements increase at an increasing 
rate with the value of each joint product (i.e., gs > 0, gZ > 0, go > 0, 
and gz, > 0). The unit cost of the inputs is r. 
The firm selects the joint products s and z that maximize unit 
profits, or 
maxw = p + oaz - 1(s,L) - rg(s,z), 
s,z 
leading to the first-order condition 
gs -is (1) 
Figure 1 sketches the nature of the firm's problem. Suppose that 
the transformation curve go = g(s, z) describes the joint product mix 
for the firm at various possible profit-maximizing levels of safety and 
novelty. The unit price curve Ro is tangent to this transformation 
curve at the optimal product mix, with the slopes of the transforma- 
tion curve and the unit price curve given by equation (1).8 For simplic- 
7One factor in a risk-utility test is the producer's role as insurer. If this factor is 
dominant, the risk-utility test becomes an absolute liability standard. 
8 The equation for the constant unit price curve is given by Po = p + az - P(s, L), 
or 
Po P + (sL) 
so that dzlds = Ala < 0. 




No Uablilty 1.0 
Safety Level 
FIG. 1.-Choice of the optimal joint product mix 
ity, this diagram illustrates the case in which the expected liability cost 
is a linear function of the level of risk. 
With a very stringent liability regime (i.e., a large value of L), the 
unit price curve becomes very steep, taking a form such as R1. This 
situation illustrates a corner solution at which the firm undertakes 
no product innovation expenditures and undertakes the maximum 
amount of safety expenditures on the transformation curve go.9 High 
levels of liability consequently may eliminate all innovation and lead 
firms to adopt designs without liability costs. Product engineers, for 
example, frequently note a bias toward accepted but somewhat risky 
designs rather than designs whose safety level is uncertain relative to 
the status quo. The observed effect may be withdrawal of the product 
altogether, as in the case of intrauterine contraceptive devices and 
some vaccines. These corner solutions play an important role in the 
empirical analysis. 
For interior solutions, the effects of liability cost L on the choice 
variables are given by 
9 It may be that with such a low market value of safety the pertinent product transfor- 
mation curve at the profit-maximizing point will be at a safety level of 1.0 rather than 
go in fig. 1. 
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d s rg.j3 L (2) 
dL D 
and 
dz - rgs3L (3) 
dL D, 
where the determinant D = (rg,,)2 - rgz(,3 + rg,,) < 0 at an interior 
maximum. 
The directions of these effects will be apparent if we impose some 
additional structure. Suppose that 13sL < 0, as is the case with the 
linear liability cost term, 13(s, L) = (1 - s)L. Higher liability costs 
will necessarily raise product safety so that dsldL > 0. The product 
innovation effect depends on the effect of innovation on the firm's 
ability to produce safety. If innovation enables the firm to increase 
safety at less cost (i.e., g,, < 0), then dz/dL > 0. If, however, innovation 
makes it more difficult for the firm to produce product safety (i.e., 
g" > 0), then dz/dL < 0. If there is no interaction between safety and 
novelty in the input requirement function (e.g., g(s, z) = f(s) + h(z)), 
then g,. = 0 and dz/dL = 0; higher liability costs will affect safety 
investments but not product novelty. There has also been speculation 
that juries may be biased against innovative products, controlling for 
the level of safety and other factors. Such an anti-innovation bias will 
tend to decrease the incentive to innovate at higher levels of liability 
cost.10 
These various results illustrate the mixed nature of the product 
liability-innovation linkage. Higher liability costs will increase prod- 
uct innovations directly related to safety improvements and also those 
that introduce new technologies if these technologies decrease the 
costs of providing safety. However, innovations that do not lower the 
marginal costs of providing safety will be depressed. In the case of 
extreme liability costs, product novelty will be eliminated altogether 
as the firm selects the no-risk corner solution. 
The different components of the innovation process-safety inno- 
vations and product novelty-may consequently respond differently 
to increasing liability costs. If we could isolate these components em- 
pirically, it would be possible to distinguish the competing effects. 
Unfortunately, we observe only overall product R & D expenditures, 
or total product introductions. The available data do not indicate, for 
example, whether the new products represent safer variants of ex- 
isting product designs or new product designs that alter attributes 
10 This variation can be readily incorporated into the model by amending the liability 
cost term to be f3(s, L, z), where 3z > 0. Equation (1) becomes gj/gz = - sl(u- V) 
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other than safety. Our empirical predictions consequently will be 
made in terms of the composite of innovative actions. 
It should also be emphasized that no value judgments can or should 
be attached to whatever liability-innovation linkage we identify. Effi- 
ciency judgments regarding these outcomes depend on the character 
of the market failure and the nature of the liability regime-issues 
that have been explored in detail elsewhere." 
III. The Sample and the Variables 
We draw the data on firm-level decisions used in this study from two 
primary sources: one pertaining to product decisions and the other 
to insurance costs. We link these data on the basis of the pertinent 
three-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code. 
Product Innovation Data 
The product characteristics data consist of a broad panel of U.S. 
firms' business units known as the Profit Impact of Marketing Strate- 
gies (PIMS) data. These data, developed by the Strategic Planning 
Institute, contain both balance sheet and income statement items for 
sample lines of business. In addition to these data, the PIMS sample 
includes information on characteristics of the business unit's industry 
and a wealth of information on the strategies followed by the respon- 
dent firms. The PIMS data have been used by Ravenscraft and 
Scherer (1982) to study R & D and by Clark and Griliches (1984), 
who focused on R & D and productivity growth. Since the PIMS 
sample consists primarily of large business units, any inferences 
drawn from the subsequent results can be made conditional on rela- 
tively large size. 
The variables drawn from the PIMS data, which table 1 defines, 
include the R & D and innovation variables and dummy indicators 
of recent entry or exit by a major competitor. We also considered a 
measure of the industry long-run growth rate and line of business 
market share, but neither of these had any effect on R & D intensity. 
To control for broad industrywide effects, all estimating equations 
also include dummy variables indicating whether the line of business 
manufactures consumer or producer durables or nondurables. Time 
dummy variables for four of the years in the 1980-84 period control 
for year-specific cyclical effects. 
The unit of observation is the line of business, which PIMS defines 
1" See esp. Oi (1973, 1974), Spence (1977), and Epple and Raviv (1978). See also 
Landes and Posner (1987), Shavell (1987), Polinsky (1989), and Viscusi (1991b). 
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as an operating unit that sells a distinct set of products or services to 
an identifiable set of customers, in competition with a well-defined 
set of competitors. The primary dependent variable in the empirical 
analysis, drawn from the PIMS data, measures dollars spent on prod- 
uct R & D relative to sales, or product R & D intensity. Other innova- 
tion variables include process R & D intensity, a measure of the per- 
centage of sales due to new products (i.e., those less than 3 years old), 
and a dummy indicator of whether the line of business does any 
R & D. 
Three dummy variables measure the long-run level of R & D activ- 
ity for each line of business. The first two of these long-run variables 
indicate whether the firm benefits substantially from patents on prod- 
ucts or processes. These variables measure long-run R & D capital 
at the firm level. The third long-run variable indicates the pace of 
technological change in the industry. The results in Levin et al. (1987) 
indicate that this latter variable is a better measure of long-run inno- 
vative activity. 
Product Liability Cost Measures 
The product liability insurance cost measures are drawn from the 
complete rate-making files of the Insurance Services Office (ISO), an 
industry consortium for pooling insurance information. The infor- 
mation utilized pertains to product liability coverage purchased by 
firms for the years 1980-84. Consumers do not pay for this coverage 
except insofar as the cost is embodied in the product price. This 
rate-making data base contains over 200,000 records, where the unit 
of observation is the particular product liability insurance policy that 
has been written.12 Using the product categorizations (which parallel 
the SIC industry codes), we aggregated the information by industry 
group to establish a total product liability premium and total product 
liability loss amount for each three-digit industry code. These data 
are available for both bodily injury coverage and property damage 
coverage, and separate variables have been created for each of these 
components of liability costs.13 We divide the aggregate premium 
and loss data by three-digit industry sales data from the Census of 
Manufactures. 
12 We focus on insurance data for bodily injury and property damage claims using 
the entire ISO file of insurance premium rates and claims data for product liability 
coverage. The number of claims and valid records is substantial. For example, in 1980 
there were over 20,242 claims involving bodily injury for which there are data on the 
loss levels. 
13 The recent escalation in liability costs throughout the United States has primarily 
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Although these data represent by far the most extensive informa- 
tion pertaining to liability costs, they do not reflect all liability ex- 
penses. Firms that self-insure or obtain coverage through a company 
not affiliated with the ISO will not be represented in this sample. The 
data consequently provide a partial assessment of the total costs of 
liability to American industry and can best be regarded as an index 
of the relative distribution of liability costs across industries, as op- 
posed to a measure of the absolute level of the liability burden.'4 
The liability costs of a product risk to a firm generally consist of the 
premium costs, the legal fees, and the uninsured costs that may be 
imposed. Since the ISO data pertain only to premiums and losses, 
excluding uncovered costs, our measures should be viewed as a proxy 
for the full liability burden.'5 
A policy written in any given year covers a 2-year period. In setting 
premium levels, the insurance adjuster relies on the manual rate for 
the product group and information about the firm's own loss history, 
as well as adjustments for the firm's current product mix. Premiums 
consequently are a measure of historical product risk levels and ex- 
pected risk levels for the current product mix. 
The second insurance measure represents losses experienced un- 
der a particular policy. Whereas premiums capture expected costs, 
losses reflect the liability costs actually incurred. These losses in turn 
will influence future premiums through the experience rating proce- 
dure. Losses are charged back to the initial policy year, so that a loss 
on a product sold in 1980 but for which the losses were incurred in 
1983 will appear in the data as a loss in 1980. 
For recent policy years (e.g., 1984), all claims that will ultimately 
be filed on policies written in that year are not yet known. However, 
these loss and claim levels can be projected using standard actuarial 
techniques. We have done this using the loss and claim projection 
factors developed by ISO. 
Sample Characteristics 
Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for the variables 
used in the PIMS/ISO sample. The R & D variables indicate substan- 
tial heterogeneity with respect to R & D activities. Product R & D 
as a percentage of sales (product R & D/sales) equals about 1.5 per- 
cent, with a standard error about 50 percent higher than the mean. 
"4 For additional discussion of this data set, see Viscusi (1991 b) and Viscusi and 
Moore (1991a, 1991c). 
15 If total costs are proportional to total premiums or total losses, then our two 
measures of insurance will have captured the full liability cost, up to a positive scale 
factor. This is clearly a best-case assumption that is unlikely to hold. 
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Twenty-one percent of the firms in the PIMS sample do no product 
R & D, whereas in some cases R & D equals 10 percent of sales. 
The R & D capital variable measuring whether firms benefit sub- 
stantially from product patents indicates that about one in every five 
members of our sample benefits substantially from past R & D efforts. 
This does not account for firms that have unpatented trade secrets, 
however, so that these numbers probably understate the extent of 
the success of the firm's R & D projects. The general level of innova- 
tive activity at the industry level is captured by the binary technologi- 
cal change variable, which indicates that 27 percent of the firms oper- 
ate in markets characterized by substantial technological change. 
The final R & D variables measure the importance of new products 
as a component of the firm's sales in the current period. Forty-seven 
percent of the firms sell some new products, with some firms re- 
porting up to 70 percent of their sales due to new products. Overall, 
the average contribution of new products to sales is not great. 
The product liability cost measures indicate that bodily injury acci- 
dent costs are greater than property damage losses. The premium 
measures exceed the loss measures because underwriting costs and 
allowance for normal industry profits create a spread between premi- 
ums and losses. 
IV. Empirical Hypotheses 
As indicated above, the empirical analysis focuses on product R & D 
intensity as the measure of current innovative activity by the firm.'6 
The basic estimating equation is 
product R & D intensity = Io + P3product patents 
+ ,B2technological change 
+ N3recent entryit (4) 
+ I34recent exitit + ylliabilityit 
+ Py2liability2 + Eit- 
Time-varying variables are indicated by the t subscript, and i indexes 
the line of business. 
The variable indicating whether the business benefits to a signifi- 
cant degree from product patents captures the role of historical levels 
of product innovation, or R & D capital, on R & D intensity as well 
as the influence of R & D capital on actual business performance.'7 
16 See Cohen and Levin (1989) for a survey of the literature on the determinants of 
R & D intensity. 
17 Clark and Griliches (1984) use a similar formulation. The results in Levin et al. 
(1987) suggest that this variable is an imperfect indicator of R & D capital. However, 
its significance argues for its inclusion as a control variable, particularly since the 
interpretation of its effect is of secondary importance. 
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The measure of the importance of technological change to the indus- 
try captures industry-specific characteristics of technological change. 
The next set of hypotheses pertains to the relationship between 
innovation expenditures and industry growth. Firms in growing and 
developing industries typically are in situations in which new product 
development is likely. We analyze a series of variables pertaining to 
the industry's growth performance, such as recent entry into the in- 
dustry and exit from the industry. The entry variable should have a 
positive effect on innovation (P3 > 0), and the exit variable should 
have a negative effect (14 < 0). 
The first set of liability influences that we explore pertains to the 
effect of product liability costs on R & D intensity. In the case of 
safety-related innovation expenditures, one would expect higher lia- 
bility levels to increase the incentive to invest in safety improvements. 
Beyond some threshold, liability costs will depress innovation, since 
the firm will produce inherently risk-free products or withdraw the 
product. With respect to safety innovation expenditures, therefore, 
we expect a positive effect at low liability cost levels, which would 
eventually be dominated by a negative relationship between liability 
costs and innovation at higher cost levels. In the case of product 
novelty innovations, we expect higher liability costs to have a negative 
effect on such innovations through all levels of liability burdens unless 
they are safety-enhancing. A positive influence of liability on innova- 
tion (-Yl + 2-y21iability > 0) indicates a dominant safety effect, whereas 
a negative influence (-Yl + 2-y21iability < 0) reflects a dominant prod- 
uct innovation discouragement effect. In each case, we expect a nega- 
tive effect of liability on innovation at high levels of liability (Y2 < 0). 
V. Empirical Results on R & D Intensity 
The measures of innovative activity available in the PIMS data can 
be distinguished according to whether they represent the long-run 
levels of innovation (i.e., the product patent and technological change 
variables), current inputs into the innovation process (i.e., the product 
and process R & D intensity variables), or the current outputs of 
R & D (i.e., the new product variable). The hypotheses developed in 
Section IV described a number of expected influences on the R & D 
intensity variable, which reflects current R & D input decisions. 
Our analysis considers four distinct measures of the expected prod- 
uct liability cost: premiums for bodily injury and for property damage 
relative to sales, and losses for bodily injury and for property damage 
relative to sales. The premium variables constitute more economically 
meaningful measures of the liability costs faced by firms. Most of the 
growth in liability costs in the 1980s related to bodily injuries. 
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Table 2 presents ordinary least squares regressions of the product 
R & D intensity variable-product R & D relative to sales-on indus- 
try, firm, and liability cost variables.'8 We include observations with 
zero R & D intensity here and explore the sensitivity of our results 
to this treatment in the next section. The liability cost variables-in 
this case, bodily injury premiums and losses relative to sales, property 
damage premiums and losses relative to sales, and their squares- 
show strong and consistent effects. In both the bodily injury and 
property damage regressions, liability costs/sales increase product 
R & D intensity at low risk levels. The nonlinearity of this effect is 
exhibited by the coefficient on the squared liability cost/sales variable, 
which is negative and significant (at the .05 confidence level) in two 
of four cases. Furthermore, the liability variables are always jointly 
significant. 
It appears that at very low liability cost levels, firms have incentives 
to invest in product safety research in order to reduce these costs, yet 
still introduce the product to the market. This is the safety incentive 
effect. When the liability cost levels become sufficiently large, the net 
effect is negative. This pattern may reflect a product withdrawal ef- 
fect on safety innovation or a dominant negative influence of the 
adverse effects of liability on product novelty at high levels of liability. 
In terms of the model above, -Yl > 0 and Y2 < 0. 
The magnitudes of the liability effects on product R & D intensity 
are meaningful in a practical sense as well. For example, with the 
coefficient estimates from the regression of product R & D intensity 
on bodily injury losses reported in column 1 of table 2, if liability 
costs fell from their mean of 0.6 percent to zero, there would be 
a reduction in product R & D intensity of 0.19, which represents 
approximately 12 percent of total R & D intensity. This linear extrap- 
18 We also estimated fixed and random effect versions of our model, controlling for 
first-order autoregression in the residuals. Because of the unbalanced nature of the 
PIMS sample, with many of the firms included in only one or two years, and the nature 
of the risk variable, which changes slowly over time within three-digit industries, we 
did not expect these techniques to yield precise results. This was borne out in the 
estimates. We thus rely on the cross-section estimates with time and industry dummies 
since they are more robust and remain unbiased in the presence of random effects 
and autocorrelation. The liability variables should be exogenous since they are prede- 
termined. The average lag between the date of an injury and the date of claim closure 
is 1.5 years. There is an additional lag between the time of product sale and the date 
of injury. These lags make it unlikely that current R & D could affect recorded losses 
and premiums. We tested for the potential endogeneity of the liability cost variables 
using the Hausman (1978) specification test. Instrumental variables included all the 
explanatory variables, two-digit industry dummies, and the legal environment variables 
considered by Viscusi (1990) in his study of the determinants of product liability risk. 
Test results indicate that the least-squares estimates do not differ significantly from 
their two-stage counterparts. 
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olation, although tenuous, indicates the practical importance of the 
liability effects.'9 
The equations in table 2 are otherwise consistent with the literature. 
The industry variables in table 2 indicate more R & D in healthy 
industries in which there is increased competition and in industries 
with technological change, as expected. 
The strength of the liability cost effect should differ between pro- 
cess and product R & D. Process R & D focuses mainly on changes 
in the way that goods are manufactured and as a result relates primar- 
ily to the manufacturing defect doctrine. In contrast, product R & D 
and product-related patents relate more to design defects. Most legal 
scholars attribute the increased liability burden over the past three 
decades to the expansion of the design defect doctrine rather than 
to the role of manufacturing defects. Moreover, design defects pose 
the most substantial risks for a firm, since the firm will face liability 
for the entire product line rather than for the small percentage of 
the products that are subject to a manufacturing defect. As a result, 
for the R & D intensity equations, we expect a much stronger influ- 
ence of liability on product-related innovation than on process- 
related innovation. 
Table 3 presents estimates of process R & D intensity regressions 
that explore this hypothesis. As expected, the effects of product liabil- 
ity costs are not as pronounced here. Only the equation that uses 
property damage premiums as the liability measure yields significant 
effects, with a positive value of yl and a negative value of Y2. 
Refinements and Sensitivity Tests 
Two alternative econometric specifications are suggested by our 
model, which emphasized the importance of corner solutions, and by 
our data, which indicate that a substantial portion of firms in the 
PIMS sample report no expenditures on R & D. To incorporate these 
features, we estimated a Tobit model. Following Bound et al. (1984), 
we also estimated a selectivity-corrected model for firms reporting 
some R & D expenditures. As noted by Bound et al., a substantial 
portion of firms in their National Bureau of Economic Research sam- 
ple report no R & D whatsoever. Whether this result indicates a cor- 
ner solution or merely nonreporting of positive expenditures is not 
clear. They provide some evidence that R & D reporting depends on 
19 The effect of a change in the bodily injury loss/sales ratio of - 0.006 would be to 
change product R & D intensity according to the formula A(R&D/S) = [33.9 - 2 x 
280.0(PLIS)]A(LIS). Evaluated at the midpoint of the interval [0, 0.006], this effect 
equals (33.9 - 1.7)(-0.006), or 0.19. 
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R & D intensity, which is the dependent variable that we use in our 
regressions. Thus the potential for selectivity bias exists. 
Results for alternative estimations indicate that the basic result is 
very robust.20 Significant and positive coefficients are found for each 
liability measure for both the Tobit and selectivity-corrected models. 
The magnitudes of the main effects, which are almost uniformly 
larger than the least-squares estimates, are as expected.21 
Another robustness test pertains to the dependent variable used. 
The results in table 2 indicate that product liability costs alter product 
R & D intensity, which presumably affects innovation outputs. A 
more direct measure of the effect of liability costs on new product 
development can be derived from an analysis of the new products 
variable. The results, summarized in table 4, mirror the earlier find- 
ings, with three important extensions. First, the percentage new prod- 
uct Tobit regressions include the R & D intensity variable as a re- 
gressor, so that the cost variables capture the effect on innovation 
given R & D intensity. Second, the new product variable measures the 
effects of the liability cost on innovation output rather than indirectly 
through the R & D intensity variable. Third, the nonlinearities are 
more precisely estimated here, since the quadratic risk term is nega- 
tive and significant in all eight possible cases. Product liability cost 
increases innovation at low liability cost levels and decreases it beyond 
a threshold. 
VI. Implications 
It is possible to use the preceding results to compute the R & D- 
maximizing risk levels and to determine which industries in the sam- 
ple lie beyond these points. For each of these industries, an important 
implication of our results is that the same level of R & D intensity 
could be generated by lower product liability cost, because of the 
quadratic nature of the R & D-liability cost relationship. If the com- 
position of R & D is the same at these two different levels of liability 
cost, then there may be an efficiency loss. To determine more gener- 
20 These results are presented in detail in Viscusi and Moore (1991 b). 
21 Furthermore, the quadratic terms are once again negative and usually significant, 
indicating that the product withdrawal effect is also quite robust. The selectivity- 
corrected results also indicate systematic unobservable differences between zero and 
nonzero R & D firms. In particular, the coefficient of the mean of the truncated 
distribution of the error term, X, in the positive R & D intensity equation is significantly 
different from zero in all four cases. This result is consistent with the findings of 
Bound et al. (1984). We also find that inclusion of the selectivity bias term has a 
substantial effect on the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients, which are double 
their values in table 2, on average. The net effect of liability costs remains unchanged, 
however, once the nonlinearities are accounted for. 
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ally whether liability costs should rise or fall requires a case-by-case 
assessment of the benefits associated with increased product availabil- 
ity, balanced by increases in health losses associated with the existence 
of dangerous products. 
For the bodily injury premium regressions reported in table 2, the 
risk level corresponding to the peak R & D level occurs at a premium/ 
sales ratio of about 5 percent.22 Similar magnitudes result for the 
bodily injury loss variable. The maximum level of R & D generated 
by bodily injury losses occurs at a ratio of bodily injury losses to sales 
of approximately 6 percent. For the property damage liability effects, 
which are smaller in magnitude relative to sales, the maximum R & D 
effects occur at levels of 2 percent for property damage losses and 3 
percent for property damage premiums. 
On the basis of the ordinary least squares equations in table 2, there 
are 11 industry groups beyond the point at which liability costs exert 
a negative effect on innovation.23 Although some of these industries 
may lie beyond the turning point simply because of sampling error 
in the estimated cost coefficients, the product mix is consistent with 
our expectations. The industry with the highest liability cost-SIC 
code 266-is the composition goods industry, which includes manu- 
facturers of asbestos insulation and other fibrous materials. The ratio 
of bodily injury losses to sales of 14 percent in this industry far ex- 
ceeds that in any of the other industries in our sample. Asbestos 
litigation now constitutes over one-half of all litigation in federal 
courts. 
There is also a high liability cost in the miscellaneous chemical 
products industry, SIC code 289. This industry produces, among 
other things, battery acid, fireworks, jet fuel igniters, and pyrotechnic 
ammunition, all of which are quite risky and associated with high 
liability levels. 
Also at or near the turning point for one or more of the liability 
variables are the rubber product industry, whose products include 
tires, a highly litigated product; pottery and related products, which 
produces bathroom fixtures and cooking ware; miscellaneous fabri- 
cated metal products, the industry in which safety valves of various 
types are produced; the metalworking machinery industry, in which 
22 The effect of bodily injury premiums/sales (BIP/S) on R & D intensity (R&D/S) is 
a(R&D/S)/a(BIP/S) = 34.1 - [2 x 337.4 X (BIP/S)]. Equating this expression to zero 
and solving for BIP/S yield the ratio BIP/S = 0.05. 
23 Earlier results reported in Viscusi and Moore (1991c) indicated that a small num- 
ber of manufacturing industries were above the point beyond which increases in prod- 
uct liability reduce R & D expenditures. These included the machine bolt and screw 
industries, construction, and some service industries. The results reported here add a 
number of auxiliary control variables and include only manufacturing firms. 
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products such as hand-held power tools, metal-cutting machine tools, 
and welding equipment are produced; the special machinery indus- 
try, in which sawmill machines, band saws, and food slicers are pro- 
duced; electrical industrial apparatus; laboratory apparatus; and mis- 
cellaneous manufacturing. Of particular note is the miscellaneous 
manufacturing industry, whose products include book matches, 
which have been the subject of product safety regulation, and cigar 
and cigarette lighters, which are heavily litigated. 
VII. Conclusions 
The empirical relationship between product liability cost and research 
and development on new products suggests systematic linkages con- 
sistent with previous evidence on specific products such as vaccines. 
Product liability costs increase product R & D intensity initially, but 
the effect eventually becomes negative. Several manufacturing indus- 
tries are located beyond the point at which R & D intensity is max- 
imized. For these products, the same R & D level could be achieved 
for a lower product liability burden. However, this conclusion focuses 
only on average industry effects, not the composition of the R & D 
or the potential desirability of the withdrawal of some specific risky 
products. 
It is not possible with our data to distinguish the effects of product 
liability on safety-related R & D expenditures and on the develop- 
ment of new varieties of the product. It is clear, however, that net 
expenditures on product R & D relative to sales rise with increases 
in product liability costs up to some level and that the portion of sales 
due to new products is similarly affected. We infer from these results 
that the development of new, safer products is the primary outcome 
engendered by the recent growth in the cost of product liability to 
firms. Whether these safety improvements represent efficiency gains 
depends on the underlying liability doctrines and their application by 
the courts. 
The product liability-innovation relationship is much stronger for 
product R & D than for process R & D. This coincides with the 
prevailing view that expansion of the design defect doctrine, rather 
than the manufacturing defect doctrine, has contributed to the in- 
creased role of product liability. These results also suggest that our 
estimates are capturing the role of liability costs rather than some 
other aspect of product quality. 
Although the findings presented here do not indicate the overall 
desirability of changes in legal rules, they do highlight clear-cut ef- 
fects that may enhance or hinder overall social welfare. Perhaps even 
more important, they identify a strong relationship between liability 
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and innovation that has made the courts a major player in the product 
innovation process. 
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